Say "Hello" to Galileo's PRS

Making the Case to Security-Minded Communities

One feature that distinguishes Galileo from other GNSS systems is the Public Regulated Service or PRS, an encrypted signal that will be used by European governmental agencies, including police, emergency services, and, potentially, military services. This article discusses the need for and applications of the service, drawing on information from the PACIFIC project (PRS application concept involving future interested customers.)

Alan Kendall, Alexis Vidal, François Boullete; EADS Astrium Services
Pascal Campagne, France Développement Conseil
Bernard Panefieu, Thales Avionics

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GPS’s widespread success has increased the use of and reliance on positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) technologies to support all kinds of civil applications. Among others, these include emergency operations, critical transport guidance, tracking of hazardous goods, and synchronization of radio communications and energy supply networks.

With Europe’s Galileo system under development, it’s time to consider how that system’s planned Public Regulated Service (PRS) will add value to Europe’s overall GNSS program. PRS is designed to provide position and timing to specific users requiring a high continuity of service, with controlled access ensured by encryption of the ranging codes and data. The sidebar, “Galileo Menu of Signals,” describes the full suite of Galileo’s services.

This article will outline the potential benefits that a secure GNSS signal will have for agencies and organizations involved in public safety and security and describe work under way to identify and inform prospective users of PRS.

Demonstrated Need
On one hand, PRS will provide continuity of PNT service for GNSS-dependent, critical applications in day-to-day operations; on the other hand, it will potentially enable access restriction of GNSS capabilities to authorized users only.

Why is this necessary?

Open GNSS services still have major weaknesses, including very low signal power. (Picture a 40-watt light bulb seen from 20,000 kilometers — or 12,427 miles — away.) This makes them vulnerable to unintentional interference and malicious jamming. Many examples of critical signal loss or jamming have been noted in the last decade, and these are likely to increase proportionately to GNSS popularity.

In December 30, 1997, for example, a Continental trans-Atlantic flight lost all GPS signals as it descended for landing in New Jersey. Officials at Continental Airlines originally believed that the flight had been subject to intentional military jamming exercises, but later investigation revealed that the interference was actually due to a U.S. Air Force test gone awry. The source of the 200-kilometer “interference zone” was a GPS antenna with a 5-watt signal, stepping through frequencies.

In other cases, the causes are less benign. Hostile or malicious GNSS jammers are indeed proliferating, boosted by low prices and do-it-yourself information on GNSS.

As a critical infrastructure, GNSS is a likely target for hostile organizations. The capabilities offered by GNSS to hostile users should also not be ignored.

In addition to the terrorist threat, hackers may experiment with degradation of GNSS for personal entertainment in the same way that they have attacked many websites on the Internet. This results in a risk of loss of PNT capabilities for any user of open GNSS services lacking appropriate mitigation capabilities.

Moreover, publicly available signal structures and interface control documentation make open GNSS services easy to replicate spuriously. Existing GNSS infrastructures do not allow users to authenticate signals readily and in real-time, rendering them vulnerable to spoofing, the broadcast of fake GNSS-like signals, and meaconing, the rebroadcast of same GNSS signals to create confusion.

In this context, the need to have an enhanced, asymmetric, global PNT capability arises for a variety of users who do not have access to the secured, military GPS signal.

Introducing PACIFIC
The PACIFIC project involves 20 companies from more than 14 European countries and was established in the context of the Galileo research and development activities. . . [the] acronym stands for "PRS Application Concept Involving Future Interested Customers" and addresses a clear need to foster the development of the PRS user segment. . .

Since September 2006, this consortium, led by the European GNSS Supervisory authority (GSA) and EADS Astrium Services, has been working on developing an understanding of PRS users including technological and organizational aspects within an appropriate security framework.

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Author Profiles

Alan Kendall is head of Secure Navigation Services with EADS Astrium. He is the project manager for PACIFIC, an EU project examining the user aspects of PRS. He is a British citizen who lives in Paris and has a German boss, so he can claim some insight into the complexities of life in Europe. Kendall graduated from Portsmouth Polytechnic with a degree in electrical and electronic engineering and worked on a number of major UK defense projects, including the Skynet 5 PPP, before moving to the field of satellite navigation.

François Boullete is project manager in satellite navigation business development with EADS Astrium Services. He has a diploma in engineering with specialization in aerodynamics from École Centrale, the French engineering school. He holds a master's degree in large projects management from HEC School of Management in Paris.

Alexis Vidal holds a specialized master's degree in project management from HEC School of Management in Paris. He is an aerospace engineer who earned degrees from École Centrale, Lyon, France and Imperial College, London. Vidal has been working on satellite navigation since he joined EADS Astrium Services in 2004, where he focuses on governmental applications and on the Galileo Public Regulated Service.

Pascal Campagne is CEO of France Développement Conseil (FDC), an independent research and consulting firm specializing in satellite navigation and positioning. He started his career in Dassault Electronique, followed by IBM, and has been responsible at the French Ministry of Defense for studies, development and procurement of navigational systems and airborne computers. He has spent 20 years in the field of satellite navigation and has supported PRS for 10 years. Campagne is involved in several projects of the European GNSS Supervisory Authority, dealing in particular with security, research and development, and international relations.

Bernard Panefieu has been responsible since 2001 for the navigation strategy of Thales Avionics AME. He is the navigation product line manager for the Thales Aerospace division in France. From 1996 to 2001, he was the French representative in the GPS Joint Program Office at Los Angeles AFB in California. Between 1990 and 1996, Panefieu headed the GPS and Navigation department in LRBA, the French technical center of expertise for radionavigation. From 1985 to 1990, he and his team created the LRBA expertise on GPS and hybridization with inertial systems. He holds an engineering degree in mechanics and aerodynamics from ENSSEIHT of Toulouse, France. He obtained his master's degree in mechanics from the Marseille Institute France.